As the appeal against the proscription of the Indigenous People of Biafra, IPOB, comes up for hearing today (Wednesday) at the Court of Appeal Abuja, IPOB Leader, Mazi Nnamdi Kanu, has applied to be joined in the suit as an interested party.

Kanu’s Special Counsel, Mr Aloy Ejimakor, in a chat with Vanguard said he would be leading a team of other lawyers to make a case for his client.

Ejimakor said he had on September 5, 2022, on behalf of Kanu, filed a process before the Court of Appeal, seeking to be joined in the mother appeal suit.

“Today, I will lead a team of lawyers to the Court of Appeal, Abuja, to make a case for #MBK to be joined as a named party in the appeal against the proscription of IPOB.

“I will also be in tag-team with Machukwu Ume, SAN, who is leading in the mother case against the proscription”, Ejimakor tweeted earlier.

Kanu had in his application as an interested party, expressed dissatisfaction with the January 18, 2017 judgement of the Federal High Court Abuja presided over by Justice A. Abdul-Kafarati, which proscribed IPOB.

Below is Kanu’s proposed notice and grounds of appeal as made available to Vanguard by his lawyer: “TAKE NOTICE that the INTERESTED PARTY/APPLICANT, being dissatisfied with the decision of the Federal High Court sitting at Abuja contained in the Ruling of Honorable Justice A. Abdul-Kafarati in Suit No: FHC/ABJ/CS/871/2017 delivered on the 18th day of January, 2018, more particularly set out at Paragraph 2, do hereby file this PROPOSED NOTICE AND GROUNDS OF APPEAL to the Court of Appeal upon the Grounds set out at Paragraph 3 and will at hearing of the Appeal seek the Reliefs set out in Paragraph 4 of this Notice and Proposed Grounds of Appeal.

“GROUND ONE:
The Learned Trial Judge erred in law when he ruled that:

“The Honourable Attorney-General in his application exparte exhibited documents showing the existence of threat to national security by the Respondent/Applicant and I accordingly made the order. By the order of 20th September 2017 prescribing the Respondent/Applicant organisation am of the firm view that the right of the Applicant to private and family life freedom of expression, right to peaceful assembly and freedom of movement have not been infringed upon. I also hold that the Applicant’s right to fair hearing has not been violated by the grant on the Exparte order.”

” Particulars of the error:
A. The ex parte Order of proscription of the Appellant and its listing as a terrorist group violated Applicant’s constitutional right to fair hearing when the 2nd Respondent, consequent upon the said Order declaring and proscribing the Appellant as a terrorist group, arrested, detained and is currently prosecuting the Applicant on charges of terrorism and as a member/leader of the Appellant on six (6) count charges solely predicated on the said Order pending on appeal.

“B. Charging the Applicant with the offenses enumerated above, which offenses are wholly predicated on the said ex parte Order, and upon which Applicant was not on notice, violated Applicant’s constitutional rights, including particularly his right to fair hearing. Section 36(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) [hereafter the ‘Constitution’] provides as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations, including any question or determination by or against any government or authority, a person shall be entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court or other tribunal established by law and constituted in such manner as to secure its independence and impartiality.”

“C. The trial court misdirected itself in law and thus occasioned a grave miscarriage of justice that has adversely affected the Applicant when it held that: “The words ‘the judge in chambers may on an application made by the Attorney-General …’ presupposes that the application is to be made ExParte”. The learned trial judge lifted the words in small close quotes from Section 2 (1)(c) of the Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act, 2013 which had used ‘judge in chambers’, not ‘ex parte’ in enacting the procedure for obtaining an Order of proscription and declaration of an entity as a terrorist organization. On the clear divergence between ‘judge in chambers’ and ‘ex parte’, the current and trite law is as follows:

“(I) The plain meaning of ex parte is not one and the same with ‘judge in chambers’. Whereas, ex parte carries elements of one party only being heard even in open court (not necessarily in chambers), a judge-in-chambers does not mean that only one party would be heard. This well-considered position was enunciated in Dingyadi v. INEC (No. 1) (2010) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1224) 1 S.C. where the Supreme Court held as follows:

“The Supreme Court and any other court are enjoined by the Constitution and the rules of natural justice to observe such rules that ensure a fair hearing or trial.

“And this includes Chambers Sittings where parties are absent and unrepresented. This cannot be achieved unless and until all parties are heard or given the opportunity of being heard. Their submissions on the issue or matter under consideration are presented by the processes and their accompanying attachments. In the instant case, no fair hearing was granted to the 1st and 2nd respondents when the appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court in Chambers and that amounted to a nullity. Consequently, all the proceedings and the judgment given were set aside by the Supreme Court. [Otapo v. Sunmonu (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt. 58) 587 referred to.] (Pp. 53-54, paras. H-B; 90, paras. G-H; 91, par as. D-E).”