By David Andy Essien, Esq.

INTRODUCTION:

Facts are fundamental in the legal system, serving as the foundation, lubricants, and initiators of the law. The process of adjudication aims to breathe life and purpose into these facts. One of the crucial tools for achieving this is the visit to the locus in quo, which allows the court to synchronize facts through sensory observation.

The term “locus in quo” is a legal phrase meaning “the place in which” and is used to refer to the location where an alleged event occurred. The visit to locus in quo, also known as “inspection of real evidence,” enables the court to employ its visual senses in conjunction with its auditory sense to attain justice. In essence, it involves the court’s firsthand authentication of what was heard in open court, utilizing its eyes and brain to observe physical objects.

The question arises whether a court can delegate the duty of visiting the locus in quo to proxies, given the court’s busy schedule. This inquiry focuses on whether the enabling statutes permit or sanction such delegation.

DO ENABLING STATUTES PERMIT AND/OR SANCTION THE DELEGATION OF VISIT TO LOCUS IN QUO BY A COURT TO ANOTHER PARTY?

To begin this investigation, it is essential to define the term “Court.” In this context, “Court” is narrowed down to mean any person, excluding arbitrators, authorized by law to take evidence. This aligns with the policy thrust of Section 258(1) of the Evidence Act 2011, which defines “Court” to include “all judges and magistrates and, except arbitrators, all persons legally authorized to take evidence.”

Section 127(1)(b) and (2)(a)-(b) of the Evidence Act 2011 serves as the starting point of this inquiry. This section identifies the “court” as the decision-maker during a visit to the locus in quo, empowering it to inspect any moveable or immovable property material to the dispute’s proper determination.

Similarly, Section 51 of the High Court Law, Cap. 63, Vol. 3, Laws of Akwa Ibom State 2022, and other related laws underscore the court’s role as the central figure during a visit to the locus in quo. These statutes provide for the court’s order to inspect movable or immovable property, with directions given by the court as deemed fit.

Thus, the inexorable inference from the enabling statutes is that a Judge or Magistrate’s exercise of the visit to locus in quo cannot and should not be delegated or assigned to other parties. Since proceedings at the locus in quo form an intrinsic part of the trial, the court must be physically present during the visit.

JUDICIAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE DELEGATION OF VISIT TO LOCUS IN QUO BY A COURT TO ANOTHER PARTY

The courts have consistently held that the visit to the locus in quo is an essential function of the adjudicating court. Delegating this duty to law enforcement agents, court officials, or any other party is considered an aberration in adjectival law.

In cases like ERDMANN EVOYOMA & 5 ORS V. OKIKI DAREGBA & 3 ORS (1968) NMLR 389 (SC), CHIEF JOSEPH OLANUDU & ANOR V. MOSES TEMIYE & 3 ORS (2001) LCN/1025 (CA), and MAI UNGUWA LAWAL MAI GEZOJI & ANOR V. AUDU KULERE (2012) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1291) 458 (CA), the courts have firmly established that inspection of the locus in quo must be conducted by the presiding court itself. Delegating this function to proxies or assessors is a nullity and a dereliction of duty, which undermines the integrity of the entire process.

CONCLUSION:

The law unequivocally supports the position that a court’s visit to the locus in quo is an inherent judicial function that cannot be delegated. Like the Wise Men personally seeking the New Born King, a court must personally embark on the visit to the locus in quo to ensure justice. Any delegation of this sacred duty nullifies the entire exercise and runs counter to the principles of the legal system.