Abstract

The Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009 came into effect under the then Chief Justice of Nigeria, Idris Legbo Kutigi, GCON, on 1st December, 2009.

The Rules were largely well received and considered as a positive revolution in the application for enforcement of fundamental rights in Nigeria, particularly against the backdrop of the difficulties encountered by applicants who sought to enforce their fundamental rights under the old Enforcement Procedure Rules, 1979. For example, under the old Rules stringent conditions were required to be fulfilled by applicants before they could apply to court for the enforcement of their fundamental rights, and the courts gave restrictive and technical interpretations of the Rules in a ways that almost always truncated or frustrated the cases of applicants, even those with facts of naked violation of their fundamental rights. But by its preamble, the overriding objectives of the 2009 Rules is to provide expansive and purposeful interpretation of the Rules, with a view to advancing and realizing the rights and freedoms contained therein, and affording the protections it intends to provide. Sadly, the recent decisions of the courts in the interpretation of the provisions of the 2009 Rules appear to have dimmed the light of hope which the Rules initially held out. This paper presents a comparative discourse of the procedures for the enforcement of fundamental rights under the 1979 and 2009 Rules. The paper critically examines the true intent and purport of the expansive and purposeful interpretation of the 2009 Rules in view of the recent Court of Appeal decisions in the cases of Kporharor v. Yedi and Udo v. Robson. The paper finds significant shortcomings in the Court’s decisions, and makes useful recommendations towards making the Rules more amenable to expansive and purposeful interpretations that will ensure flexible and effective enforcement of fundamental rights in Nigeria.

Keywords: Human rights violation, Fundamental rights applications, Fundamental rights enforcement, Fundamental rights enforcement procedure rules, Expansive and purposeful interpretation

*DSW, LLB, (BENIN); LL,M (IBADAN); BL. Legal Officer, Legal Section, Nigeria Police Force, Zone 2 Police Command Headquarters, Lagos, Nigeria. Email: [email protected], GSM: 08030699275

Introduction
Historical Background of the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules in Nigeria.

Fundamental Human Rights are those rights which are attached to the individual and to which he is entitled by reason of the fact that he is a human being.[1] Fundamental rights have also been defined as those aspects of human rights which have been recognized and entrenched in the Constitution of a Country; rights which are specially provided for to enhance human dignity and liberty in every modern state.[2] In the interpretation of Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules Nigerian courts have given elaborate definition of fundamental rights.[3] Thus, fundamental rights provisions have continued to feature prominently in the Constitutions of Nigeria[4] since independence in 1960. The recommendation to make the fundamental human rights provisions as a part of the Nigerian Constitution was contained in the Willink Minorities Commission Report of 1958. In order to allay the fears of the minority ethnic groups in the Nigerian Federation[5], the Commission recommended the entrenchment of fundamental rights in the Constitution. Consequently, the fundamental rights provisions were embodied in the 1960 independence Constitution, and subsequent Constitutions[6] continued to make copious provisions for the protection of the fundamental rights of Nigerians.

Although the fundamental rights provisions were contained in the 1960 and 1963 Nigerian Constitutions, there were no specific procedural rules to regulate their enforcement prior to 1979. However, this lacuna was filled with the introduction of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure Rules), 1979, made by the then Chief Justice of Nigeria pursuant to the Constitution. While the introduction of the 1979 Rules was highly applauded by all, the stringent conditions and procedures for the enforcement of fundamental rights under the Rules made it extremely difficult for applicants to successfully enforce their rights. For example, conditions such as obtaining leave of court to enforce fundamental rights, filing of verifying affidavit, etc[7] were mandatory under the 1979 Rules and this made fundamental rights enforcement to be cumbersome, slow and frustrating. Even if an applicant applied for leave, granting such leave by the court was not automatic as the court had to satisfy itself that the reliefs sought by the Applicant fell within the fundamental provisions in the Constitution. And the court would also decide whether the applicant’s intended application disclosed a prima facie cause of action. It follows therefore that, if the alleged violation of the Applicant fundamental right was on-going, the applicant would have to endure the violation of his rights and could only file fundamental enforcement application when, and only when, the court granted him leave to apply.

Therefore, the introduction of the Fundamental Rights’ Enforcement Rules, 2009 was viewed as a positive revolution in fundamental rights’ enforcement in Nigerian legal system because the Rules removed the bottleneck under the 1979 Rules. By its preamble, the overriding objectives of the 2009 Rules is to give it expansive and purposeful interpretation with a view to advancing and realizing the rights and freedoms contained in the Rules, and affording the protections it intends to provide. Unfortunately, with respect to the interpretation of the 2009 Rules the recent decisions of the Court of Appeal of Nigeria in the cases of Solomon Kporharor & Anor v. Mr. Micheal Yedi & Ors (2017) LPELR-42418 (CA) and Udo v. Robson & ors (2018) LPELR-45183 (CA), Pp. 12 – 25, Paras C-A appear to have dimmed the light of hope which the introduction of the 2009 Rules held out. In these cases, the Court of Appeal held that that two or more persons cannot commence fundamental rights enforcement application within one suit. The Court of Appeal in these cases nullified the applicants’ respective application for enforcement of their fundamental rights on the ground of misjoinder of parties. In arriving at its decisions, the Court relied on earlier cases decided by the Supreme Court under the 1979 Rules. This therefore calls into question the true intent and purport of the expansive and purposeful interpretation envisaged by the 2009 Rules.

Since the overriding objectives of the 2009 Rules is expansive and purposeful interpretation of the Rules with a view to advancing and realizing the rights and freedoms contained therein, and affording the protections it intends to provide, it would be useful at this stage to fully understand in detail the concept of “overriding objectives of the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules, 2009”.

The Meaning of Overriding Objectives of the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules 2009
The overriding objectives of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009 simply means the highest priority of the rules and the most important thing the rules must achieve for all applicants for enforcement of fundamental rights under the Rules. In order words, the overriding objectives of the 2009 Rules encompass the most important things the maker of the 2009 Rules intends for the Rules to achieve for applicants enforcing their rights under the Rules. It follows from the foregoing that there were certain inadequacies in the previous 1979 Rules which restricted or hampered the efforts at fundamental rights’ enforcement by applicants whose fundamental rights were violated. The introduction of the 2009 Rules was therefore to address those inadequacies or shortcomings in the old 1979 Rules.

Paragraphs 3(a) – (g) of the 2009 Rules provide for the overriding objectives for the purpose of advancing, and not to restrict, applicant’s rights enforcement, and in the interpretation of the Rules the courts must ensure that this objective is accomplished. Similarly, in the hearing of fundamental rights applications the courts must interpret the Rules proactively so as to enhance the capacity of all classes of applicants to access to justice, including the encouragement of public interest litigation.[8] In addition, fundamental rights cases are to be treated as emergency. These and more represent the overriding objectives of the 2009 Rules. The courts have given effect to the overriding objectives of the 2009 Rules in some cases.[9] But whether the courts have done enough to promote the overriding objectives of the 2009 Rules, and whether the courts have achieved the expansive and purposeful interpretation of the Rules are examined in the next section.

Conditions for the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979 Vis-A-Vis the Innovations in the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Rules, 2009
The 1979 Rules came into effect on the 1st January, 1980 and was made pursuant to Chapter 1V of the 1979 Constitution. The procedure for the enforcement of the fundamental rights of applicants under the 1979 Rules was strict and required full compliance without any breach.[10] The 1979 Rules were as strict and inviolate as the sections of the Constitution under which the Rules were made. Any violation of the Rules was not considered as mere irregularity but treated as serious violation which would deprive the court the jurisdiction to hear and determine the application on the merit.[11] These stringent conditions under the 1979 Rules made enforcement of fundamental rights to be cumbersome and mostly unsuccessful for applicants. The stringent conditions under the 1979 Rules vis-a-vis the innovations in the 2009 Rules are considered below:

Obtaining Leave:[12] The 1979 Rules provided that a person that wanted to enforce his or her fundamental rights must first obtain the leave of court to enforce his or her rights.[13] This condition was stringent because failure to obtain leave of court by the applicant rendered the application void.[14] This mandatory condition for leave under the 1979 Rules made the enforcement of right cumbersome for the applicant, and in most cases the applicant was refused the leave to enforce. But under the 2009 Rules there is no provision for leave to apply, hence the applicant will apply directly to court for the enforcement of his fundamental rights.[15] This is a great innovation of the 2009 Rules as it makes it easier for applicants to enforce their fundamental rights.
The applicant must use the same Statement in both the Ex parte Motion for Leave and the Motion on Notice for enforcement of fundamental rights:[16] This condition was very stringent under the 1979 Rules because if the applicant used a Statement in his Motion on Notice that was different from the Statement in his Ex parte Motion for Leave, his application for enforcement would be void.[17] But there is no such requirement under the 2009 Rules so the issue of using the same Statement for Ex parte application for leave and Motion on Notice for enforcement does not arise. This is another innovation of the 2009 Rules to the relief of applicants.
The Applicant must enter the Motion on Notice for enforcement of his fundamental rights within 14 days after Leave is granted:[18] This was another stringent condition under the 1979 Rules because failure of the applicant to enter his Motion on Notice for the enforcement of his fundamental rights within 14 days after leave was granted to him rendered the application invalid. To enter his Motion on Notice within 14 days after Leave was granted meant that the applicant must file his Motion on Notice within 14 days after Leave was granted.[19] Though the 2009 Rules provides that application shall be fixed for hearing within 7 days from the day the application was filed[20], failure to fix the case for hearing within 7 days of filing does not render the application invalid. This is a remarkable departure from the 1979 Rules.
The Applicant must personally depose to Affidavit of Service as Bailiff’s Affidavit was not sufficient:[21] This was a stringent condition under the 1979 Rules because failure of the applicant to personally depose to the Affidavit of Service rendered the application improper and incompetent before the court.[22] There is no provision for the applicant to personally depose to the Affidavit of Service under the 2009 Rules, and this makes applications for fundamental rights enforcement to be easier than it was under the 1979 Rules.[23]
Application under the 1979 Rules was affected by the Limitation Rule:[24] This was another stringent condition under the 1979 Rules as failure of the applicant to file his application within 12 months rendered the application incompetent. It is important to state here that where violation is continuous, the limitation period will not start counting until the violation stop.[25] But under the 2009 Rules, it is specifically provided that application for the enforcement of fundamental right shall not be affected by any limitation statute whatsoever. This is a commendable innovation of the 2009 Rules violation of fundamental rights may be enforcement anytime it is convenient or practicable for the applicant.
Preliminary objection must be taken before the main action: Due to this provision Respondents in fundamental rights application under the 1979 Rules were quick to file preliminary objections to the application, and such preliminary objections must be taken before anything could be done in the main application. But under the 2009 Rules, any preliminary objection is taken together with the substantive application[26]. This is another improvement in the 2009 Rules over the 1979 Rules.
Mode of commencement: Under the 1979 Rules, application for enforcement of fundamental rights by the applicant after Leave was granted must be by Motion on Notice or by Originating Summons.[27] This was a stringent condition as failure to adopt the Motion on Notice or Originating Summons for the application rendered the application incompetent. But under the 2009 Rules, an applicant may commence a fundamental rights’ enforcement action by any originating process accepted by the court.[28] This has undoubtedly made application for fundamental rights’ enforcement more flexible and less technical than it was under the 1979 Rules.
Non-compliance: Under the 1979 Rules non-compliance with any of the provisions of the Rules rendered the application void and liable to be dismissed upon a preliminary objection by the Respondent. But under the 2009 Rules non-compliance with the Rules is to be treated as an irregularity which may not nullify the proceedings unless such non-compliance relates to mode of commencement[29] This is an innovation under the 2009 Rules because it helps to save many fundamental rights applications with some form of non-compliance with the Rules, which would have led to a dismissal of such applications under the 1979 Rules.
One person, one application: It was well established under the 1979 Rules that application for enforcement of fundamental rights should only be brought by one applicant. In other words, it was one applicant, one application, and where two or more persons filed one application such application would be incompetent and liable to be struck out.[30] Until recently, when the Court of Appeal decided in the cases of Solomon Kporharor & Anor v. Mr. Micheal Yedi & Ors[31] and Udo v. Robson & Ors[32] that more than one applicant cannot bring one application for the enforcement of their fundamental rights, it was generally presumed by lawyers that the 2009 Rules has, by its innovation, removed that stringent condition of one person, one application under the 1979 Rules. However, with the Court of Appeal decisions in Kporharor case and Udo’s case, the old stringent condition of one per person, one application, such that several persons whose rights were violated together by the same actor would have to bring individual application with its cost implication, is now reinstated. As the law is now, where more than one person brings one application for the enforcement of their fundamental rights, such application will be incompetent. How justifiable these Court of Appeal decisions in Kporharor’s case and Udo’s case with respect to the expansive and purposeful interpretation of the 2009 rules examined in the next section.
Other innovations of the 2009 Rules include[33]:

Specific provision for written address to be used for hearing of fundamental rights application, unlike oral submission under the 1979 Rules.
Applicant or Respondent’s written address can be deemed adopted in his absence upon an oral application made by the Counsel in court for the written address of the absent Counsel to be deemed adopted.
Other persons who are not party to the fundamental rights application can be heard because the 2009 Rules encourage Amici Curiae.
Speedy and expeditious dispensation of cases by giving fundamental rights application overriding precedence and priority over all daily business of the court.
Guaranteed increased and unlimited access to applicants seeking to enforce their fundamental rights.
Elimination of technicalities in fundamental rights enforcement cases.
In the interpretation of the 2009 Rules the courts simplify and liberalize the procedure that should be adopted by applicants, including the hearing of the case. For example, no fundamental rights enforcement case should be dismissed on the ground that the applicant did not strictly comply with the Rules. Substantial compliance should suffice.
True Intent and Purport of the Expansive and Purposeful Interpretation of the 2009 Rules
The phrase “expansive and purposeful interpretation’’ of the 2009 Rules means that the interpretation of the 2009 Rules should be open and resolute in achieving the overriding objectives of the Rules, which is to advance applicants’ rights and enhance their access to justice. From the foregoing, the intent and purport of the expansive and purposeful interpretation of the 2009 Rules are as follows:

The courts should interpret the 2009 Rules in a manner to eliminate all the stringent conditions that created a barrier and made the enforcement of fundamental rights under the 1979 Rules cumbersome.
The courts should interpret the 2009 Rules in ways that advance applicants’ rights, and never to limits their rights.
The courts should interpret the 2009 Rules in a matter that enhances applicants’ access to the courts and justice.
When interpreting the 2009 Rules, the courts should respect municipal, regional and international bills of rights cited to it or brought to its attention by applicants with a view to enhancing applicants’ access to the courts and justice.
The courts should give accelerated hearing to all fundamental rights cases before it.
The courts should interpret the 2009 Rules in ways that eliminate technicalities in the determination of fundamental rights enforcement cases.
We opine here without hesitation that if the Courts adhere to above identified intent and purport of the expansive and purposeful interpretation of the 2009 Rules, no fundamental rights case will be struck out merely because several Applicants commence their enforcement of rights with one suit. This is because allowing two or more than one person commencing one suit for the rights enforcement application will enhances the litigants’ ability to enforce their rights, most especially where, and when, their rights were violated, or about to be violated in the same course of action, and by the same actors. Allowing such procedure will save time, and resources of both the Applicants, the Courts and even the Respondents. It is for this reason that we say that the Court of Appeal decisions in Solomon Kporharor & Anor v. Mr. Micheal Yedi & Ors[34] and Udo v. Robson & Ors[35] has now created a new cloud in fundamental rights enforcement litigation in Nigeria.

A Critique of the Court of Appeal Decisions in Kporharor v. Yedi and Udo v. Robson
When the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009 came into effect there was the general belief among stakeholders in the Nigerian justice system that the introduction of the Rules was to ensure the advancement of fundamental rights’ enforcement and enhance applicants’ access to justice. It was not expected that interpretation of the 2009 Rules by the courts would restrict applicants’ efforts at enforcing their fundamental rights as was the case under the previous 1979 Rules.[36] Rather, it was expected that the courts would give expansive and purposeful interpretations of the 2009 Rules in ways that would accommodate an application for the enforcement of the fundamental rights of more than one person within one enforcement action. In other words, it was expected that the Rules would allow persons who felt that their rights were violated or about to be violated by the same actors and in the same course of action to jointly commence the enforcement of their fundamental rights in one application against the alleged rights violators[37]. Indeed, this was the position beginning from 1st December, 2009 when the 2009 Rules came into force until 4th May, 2017 when the Court of Appeal,[38] in the case of Solomon Kporharor & Anor v. Mr. Micheal Yedi & Ors,[39] held that an application commenced by two or more persons is defective and incompetent for misjoinder.[40]

While legal practitioners were still pondering the decision in Kporharor’s case the Court of Appeal again confirmed and re-enforced this decision in the subsequent case of Udo v. Robson & Ors (supra).[41] The facts of this two cases[42]are similar in that in both cases more than one applicant commenced the fundamental rights’ enforcement action jointly in one application. Accordingly, in both cases the issue for determination turned on “whether it is proper to join several applicants in one application for purposes of securing the enforcement of their fundamental rights”. But difference between the two cases is that whereas the Kporharor’s case was commenced in 2005 under the 1979 Rules at the High Court of Delta State, the case Udo’s case was commenced in 2011 under the 2009 Rules at the High Court of Akwo Ibom State, hence different Rules were ordinarily applicable to the two cases.

However, the decisions in the two cases have a common legal effect because the appeal in the two cases were decided almost at the same time, and the Court of Appeal in the Udo’s case relied on the Kporharor’s case without considering the fact that the two cases were commenced under different Rules. At the time of writing this paper, these two Court of Appeal cases remain the position of law in Nigeria; that “it is improper and incompetent to join several applicants in one application for purposes of securing the enforcement of their fundamental rights.” While we await and hope that the opportunity will present itself to the Supreme Court of Nigeria to make a final decision, it is germane to understand the shortcomings of the Court of Appeal decisions in the two cases. This we now do by way of an outline below;

The decisions were based on technicality which has severally been condemned by the Supreme Court.[43]
The position of the Court in the cases, that is, one person one application, will lead to waste of time and resources by the applicants, the court and even the respondents.[44]
It can lead to having divergent and conflicting judgments on the separate suits by different judges, even if from the same Court, on applications that emanated from same course of action and same actors.
The position of the Court in the two cases, that after each of the applicants in similar cases has filed separate action, they should apply for consolidation of the similar cases will affect the requirement of speedy determination of fundamental rights suits, which is one of the overriding objectives of the 2009 Rules.[45]
The Court in the two cases could not bring forth in its judgments what injustice the Respondents suffered as a result of more than one person bringing one action for the enforcement of their rights. In both cases, Respondents were duly represented, and had the opportunity to present their responses before the ruling of the trial Court.[46]
The decisions in the two cases did not advance applicants’ access to the courts and justice.
The decisions in the two cases is not even an advantage to the Respondents in fundamental rights’ enforcement action because if the trial court relies on the decisions and strikes out applicants’ application for misjoinder of party, they are at liberty to bring fresh individual action on the same matter, since striking out does not in any way estop them from so doing.
Recommendations and Conclusion
As already noted, the Court of Appeal decisions in the cases of Solomon Kporharor & Anor v. Mr. Micheal Yedi & Ors and Udo v. Robson & Ors remain the present position of law in Nigeria; the judicial principle that it is improper and incompetent to join several applicants in one application for purposes of securing the enforcement of their fundamental rights. However, we hasten to recommend that applicants whose cases are struck out based on this judicial principle should endeavour to test the principle at the Supreme Court so as to have a final pronouncement on these Court of Appeal decisions. While we await when the Supreme Court will have the opportunity to make a final pronouncement on this significant procedure for the enforcement of fundamental rights in Nigeria, we further recommend that the Chief Justice of Nigeria should, as a matter of urgency, review and amend the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009 in order to remove this setback in the enforcement of fundamental rights introduced by the Court of Appeal decisions in the cases of Solomon Kporharor & Anor v. Mr. Micheal Yedi & Ors and Udo v. Robson & Ors.

[1] Uzo, I.D., Guide to Fundamental Rights Litigation (Lagos: Law Digest Publishing Co. 2005) at 1

[2] Hon. Justice Abdu Aboki, Proceedings Under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement) Procedure Rules 2009, (being a paper delievered at the National Judicial Institute, Abuja for Judges.

[3] See the Supreme Court definition of fundamental rights in the case of Odogu v. A.G. of the Federation (1999) 6 NWLR (Pt.456) P. 508 @ 552 and the Court of Appeal definition of fundamental rights in the cases of Uzoukwu & Ors v. Ezenu 11 & Ors (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt.200) P. 708 @ 761.

[4] Nwafor, A.O. Enforcing Fundamental Rights in Nigeria Courts – Processes and Challenges, (4 African Journal of Legal Studies, 2009) 1-11, at 1

[5] Ibid. at 1

[6] 1963, 1979, 1989 and 1999 Constitutions.

[7] See Order 1, Rule 2 (2) of Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure Rules), 2009

[8] Ibid 2 at page 3

[9] See the case of Ogbe v. Okonkwo & Ors (2018) LPELR-43876(CA), P. 22, Paras C-F,

[10] Uzo, I.D., Guide to Fundamental Rights Litigation (Lagos: Law Digest Publishing Co. 2005) at 78 – 79

[11] Ibid.

[12] See Order 1, Rule 2 (2) of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979

[13] Ibid.

[14] The Registered Trustees of the Faith Tebernacle Congragation Church Nigeria & 3 Ors v. Abel Uche Ikwechegt (2001 1 CHR 431.

[15] Order 2 Rule 2 of the of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009

[16] See Order 2, Rule 2 (1) of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979

[17] HRN Obol Ubi Ujung Unah & 4 Ors v. Marcus Ukoi (2003) 3 CHR 431.

[18] Order 2, Rule 1 (2) of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979

[19] Ibid.

[20] Order IV, Rule 1 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009

[21][21] Order 2, Rule 1 (4) of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979

[22] Nwaeze v. Enugu State Commissioner of Police (2001) 1 CHR 449.

[23] See Order V on service of fundamental rights application

[24] Order 1 Rule 3 (1) See Order 1 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979

[25] Okukwujigha c. NDLEA (2001) 1 CHR 493.

[26] Order VIII, Rule 4 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009

[27] Order 2, Rule 1 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979.

[28] Order II, Rule 2 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009.

[29] Order IX of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009

[30] RTFTCIN v. Ikwechugh (2000) 13 NWLR (Pt. 683), P. 1; Okechukwu v. Wlukokwu (1998) 8 NWLR (Pt. 562) P. 511

[31] (2017) LPELR-42418(CA)

[32] (2018) LPELR-45183(CA)

[33] Hon. Justice Abdu Aboki, Proceedings Under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement) Procedure Rules 2009, (being a paper delievered at the National Judicial Institute, Abuja for Judges.

[34] (2017) LPELR-42418 (CA), Pp. 8-13, Paras F-A

[35] (2018) LPELR-45183(CA)

[36] RTFTCIN v. Ikwechugh (2000) 13 NWLR (Pt. 683), P. 1; Okechukwu v. Etukokwu (1998) 8 NWLR (Pt. 562) P. 511

[37] This save time and resources for Applicants.

[38] Benin Division, per BADA, JCA

[39] (2017) LPELR-42418 (CA), Pp. 8-13, Paras F-A

[40] The Court also he that two or more persons commencing one suit for enforcement of fundamental rights is a clear violation of Section 46 (1) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria and 2009 Fundamental Rights Enforcement (Procedure) Rules, because more than one applicant cannot joined together to bring one application.

[41] Judgment delivered by the Court of Appeal, Calabar Division, per ADAH, JCA, on 20th July, 2018

[42] The facts of this cases cannot be fully stated here for lack of space, but the can be found in the full judgment of the Courts on the citation of the case here.

[43] The Courts has now departed from technical justice to substantial justice. See the cases of Oyeyemi & Ors v. Owoeye & Anor (2017) LPELR-41903(SC); John v. State (2019) LPELR-4693(SC) hence striking out Applicants suit because two or more persons commenced fundamental one application is technical justice taken too far.

[44] For instance where the rights of a group of persons, numbering maybe 50 in numbers, were allegedly violated or about to be violated by the same persons in the same course of action, each of the 50 persons will commence separate suit, and in this case, 50 suits will flood the already busy Courts, which will fixed the 50 cases for separate hearing and the Respondent(s) on the other hand, who is the same person or are the same persons will have to file 50 responses to the 50 suits. This calamitous and unreasonable.

[45] From the personal experience of the writer, application for consolidation of similar suits for enforcement of fundamental rights suits has taken over two years to be heard and ruled upon. While we appreciate that some Courts may determine consolidation application and the main applications speedily, it is better and merrier if more than one person can maintain one action in cases of alleged violations that arose from the same course of action

[46] We opine that the Court can only rely on technical opposition to a case if, and only if, not relying on it will occasion grave injustice to the party raising the technical argument.