By Hameed Ajibola Jimoh Esq.

By Hameed Ajibola Jimoh Esq.

The importance of fundamental rights enforcement in Nigeria to the Nigerian citizens cannot be overemphasized. Notwithstanding the objectives of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009,-herein after referred to as the FREPR-, as stated in its introductory part, when courts (whether as the court of first instance or an appellate court) of law decides fundamental rights matters in favour of the applicant who is a victim of violation by the Government’s agency concerned, or sometimes too, a private person, the enforcement of such judgment renders the decision of the court useless and of no effect due to the cumbersome  nature of the judgment enforcement procedures as legislated under the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act and the Judgment Enforcement Rules made thereunder, especially money judgment. Therefore, for many years after obtaining judgment in court in his favour, the Applicant is engaged in another greater litigation that lasts for years either in Garnishee proceedings or under other enforcement of judgment procedures! This then mean that justice has not been served in the part of the Applicant or the victim of the violation of human rights despite what he had suffered in the hands of the alleged violator! This indeed is very unfortunate and hence the need for My Lord, the Honourable, the Chief Justice of Nigeria to make provisions for specific Rules on the enforcement of fundamental rights judgment so that justice would not only be done in the case of the Applicant and or the victim of the fundamental rights violation but would also be seen to have been done, hence, this paper humbly appeals (on a compassionate ground) and recommend to My Lord, the Honourable, the Chief Justice of Nigeria, who has been saddled with the defence and or protection of the fundamental rights of Nigerian citizens to make a ‘Fundamental Rights’ Judgments (Enforcement) Rules, for enforcing fundamental rights judgments in Nigeria, in the interest of justice. This paper is also of the firm view and submission that protection of fundamental rights or human rights of the Nigerian citizens by our Nigerian Courts is non-negotiable!

First and foremost, fundamental rights are rights entrenched in Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended)-herein after referred to as the Constitution, while human rights are entrenched in other international human rights and are wider than the fundamental rights. Though, fundamental rights or human rights are both enforceable using the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009-herein after referred to as the FREPR. By section 46(1) of the Constitution, Nigerian Courts have been empowered to hear and or determine applications and or allegations on breach of fundamental rights and or human rights.

As rightly stated above, Fundamental rights are rights entrenched in Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended)-herein after referred to as the Constitution, while human rights are entrenched in other international human rights laws and are wider than the fundamental rights. Though, fundamental rights or human rights are both enforceable using the FREPR. See: the Preamble to the Rules. Furthermore, it is my submission nevertheless, that human rights and fundamental rights do not mean the same thing in concept. The various concepts surrounding the nomenclature of the words ‘human rights’, ‘fundamental rights’, ‘legal/civil rights’, ‘enforceable rights’ and ‘unenforceable rights’ have been dealt with in the case of Uzoukwu v Ezeonu II (1991) 6, NWLR (pt. 200), p.708 at 760-761, where Nasir PCA thus ‘Due to the development of constitutional law in this field, distinct difference has emerged between ‘Fundamental Rights’ and ‘Human Rights’. It may be recalled that human rights were derived from and out of the wider concept of natural rights. They are rights which every civilized society must accept as belonging to each person as a human being. These were termed human rights. When the United Nations made its declaration, it was in respect of ‘Human Rights’ as it was envisaged that certain rights belong to all human beings irrespective of citizenship, race, religion and so on. This has now formed part of international law. Fundamental rights remain in the realm of domestic law. They are fundamental because they have been guaranteed by the fundamental law of the country; that is, by the Constitution. Some of the provisions are limited to the citizens while other provisions are applicable to all persons, citizens and aliens alike. This is the position in this country, in the United States, in India, and many other countries. It is a common ground that citizens and aliens alike enjoy legal rights, popularly called civil rights, some have been chosen and elevated to the level of Fundamental Rights and are protected and enforced under the Constitution. Other legal rights are themselves protected by law and many of them are justiciable. Such rights as the right to own property, the right to form clubs, the right to build houses, and so on, are legal rights which are justiciable and enforceable in the courts. There are other rights which may pertain to a person which are neither fundamental nor justiciable in the courts. These may include rights given by the Constitution as under the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles under Chapter 3 of the Constitution’ (underlining is mine for emphasis). Also see: the case of Odogwu v A.G. of the Federation (1999) 6 NWLR (PT. 455) P. 508 Ratio 6 and the case of A.C.N. V I.N.E.C. (2013)13 NWLR (pt. 1370) 161 SC, the Supreme Court of Nigeria held thus ‘Without law and its rules regulating the enforcement and enjoyment of rights under the law, chaos will reign supreme, with every man pursuing and enjoying his real or perceived rights without regard to the rights of others, and organised society may come to an end’. Also, to these is that there are those human rights laws contained in the Chapter II of the Constitution which have been generally made to be non-justiciable or unenforceable except under some certain exceptions. By section 46(1) of the Constitution, Nigerian Courts have been empowered to hear and or determine applications and or allegations on breach of fundamental rights and or human rights.

Also, the Supreme Court of Nigeria in the case of Odogwu v A.G. of the Federation (1999) 6 NWLR (PT. 455) P. 508 Ratio 6, defined fundamental human rights thus ‘A fundamental human right is a right guaranteed in the Nigerian constitution and it is a right which every person is entitled to, when he is not subject to the disabilities enumerated in the constitution to be enjoyed by virtue of being a human being. They are so basic and fundamental that they are entrenched in a particular chapter of the constitution’. Also, the Supreme Court of Nigeria has held in the case of Jim-Jaja v C.O.P. Rivers State (2013)6 NWLR (Pt. 1350) 225 SC. (page 254 paragraphs E-F and F-G) on the objectives of the procedure of fundamental human right thus ‘The procedure for the enforcement of the Fundamental Human Right was specifically promulgated to protect the Nigerian’s fundamental rights from abuse and violation by authorities and persons. When a breach of the right is proved, the victim is entitled to compensation even if no specific amount is claimed’. This Court also stated in that an Applicant in fundamental rights enforcement suit does not need to prove either exemplary or aggravated damages. (Underlining is mine for emphasis). Also see the latest case of: Peter Okibe v NDLEA (2022) LPELR- 56995 (CA) in this respect. Furthermore, the FREPR provides for the overriding objectives of the Rules which the Court shall give effect to in its Preamble thus 1. ‘The Court shall constantly and conscientiously seek to give effect to the overriding objectives of these Rules at every stage of human rights action, especially whenever it exercises any power given to it by these Rules or any other law and whenever it applies or interprets any rule.  3. The overriding objectives of these Rules are as follows: (a) The Constitution, especially Chapter IV, as well as the African Charter, shall be expansively and purposely interpreted and applied, with a view to advancing and realising the rights and freedoms contained in them and affording the protections intended by them. (b) For the purpose of advancing but never for the purpose of restricting the applicant’s rights and freedoms, the Court shall respect municipal, regional and international bills of rights cited to it or brought to its attention or of which the Court is aware, whether these bills constitute instruments in themselves or form parts of larger documents like constitutions. Such bills include; (i.) The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other Instruments (including protocols) in the African regional human rights system, (ii) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other instruments (including protocols) in the United Nations human rights system, (c) For the purpose of advancing but never for the purpose of restricting the applicant’s rights and freedoms, the Court may make consequential orders as may be just and expedient. (d) The Court shall proactively pursue enhanced access to justice for all classes of litigants, especially the poor, the illiterate, the uninformed, the vulnerable, the incarcerated, and the unrepresented.’

Therefore, having regards to the above submissions, it is my further submission that the protection of our fundamental rights (as citizens) of Nigeria by our Nigerian Courts is never negotiable and our courts must protect same with passion and compassion! In the case of Abia State University, Uturu v Anyaibe (1996) 3 NWLR (pt. 439) 646 at 661, per Katsina-Alu, JCA (as he then was) held that the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules made pursuant to the Constitution, have the force of law as the Constitution itself; and overrides the provisions of any other enactment to the contrary. In which case, such a provision has equal force of law as the Constitution itself.  Furthermore, I humbly submit that fundamental rights suits are sui generis (i.e. of their own Rules and Procedures). The following cases are noteworthy too: in the case of Enukeme v Mazi (2015)17 NWLR (1488)411 C.A. at page 434 paras. A-C, Mbaba, J.C.A. (delivering the leading judgment), held thus ‘I must start by stating the obvious, that Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure is sui generis, being specially and specifically designed with its own unique rules by the Constitution, to address issues of fundamental rights of persons protected under the Constitution. Of course, consideration of issues founded on breaches of fundamental rights in this case must be handled within the exclusive confines of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009, which actually came to correct some perceived wrongs and hardship which the 1979 Rules (fashioned on the 1979 Constitution) caused to applicants seeking enforcement of their fundamental rights, especially in the areas of adherence to undue technicalities and delays in determining applications’. The case of Loveday v Comptroller, Fed. Prisons Aba (2013) 18 NWLR (pt. 1386) 379 C.A. is also relevant and relied upon on this issue. Furthermore, under the Constitution, Chapter IV has laid down all the fundamental rights that every person as a Nigerian citizen is entitled to. Also, under the Constitution, section 46 and Order II Rule I of the FREPR provides that ‘any person who alleges that any of the provisions of the Constitution in Chapter IV has been or is likely to be contravened in any State in relation to him may apply to a High Court for redress’. (Underlining is mine for emphasis).

Now, it is no doubt that powers of the National Assembly of Nigeria to legislate on enforcement of judgment emanated from item 57 of the Exclusive Legislative List contained in the Par I to the Second Schedule to the Constitution which provides thus ‘Service and execution in a State of the civil and criminal processes, judgments, decrees, orders and other decisions of any court of law outside Nigeria or any court of law in Nigeria other than court of law established by the House of Assembly of that State’ and also see section 4 of the Constitution. Nevertheless, this constitutional provisions, it is my humble submission that My Lord, the Honourable, the Chief Justice of Nigeria, being the custodian of the Fundamental Rights Enforcement in Nigeria constitutionally, has the powers to having regards to make the FREPR which My Lord had done by the 2009 Rules and the incidental Rules to bring the FREPR into the necessary effects by making the ‘Fundamental Rights’ Judgments (Enforcement) Rules’ for the nation! This my submission is hanged on the following grounds below.

The first is that fundamental rights enforcement proceedings and the Rules made to that effect are sui generis. Legal authorities of our courts have been espoused in the preceding paragraphs of this article. Therefore, My Lord, the Honourable, the Chief Justice of Nigeria’s powers to make the Fundamental Rights Judgments (Enforcement) Rules being recommended by this paper is not in dispute and same is guaranteed by the Constitution itself!

Also, the facts that the item 57 of the Exclusive Legislative List confers powers on the National Assembly exclusively does not mean that the fundamental rights matters and the judgments made from such matters are not excluded from the powers of the National Assembly. It is my considered opinion that the item 57 of the Part I to the Second Schedule to the Constitution is general in nature while the fundamental rights matters and judgments are specific in nature and specific is not covered by a general power. This in latin maxim is known as ‘SPECIALIA GENERALIBUS DEROGANT’. Our Nigerian courts have also held in this regard thus “Where there are 2 enactments, one making specific provisions and the other, general provisions, the specific provisions are impliedly excluded from the general provisions”:  AGF vs ABUBAKAR  (2007) All FWLR pt. 375 pg. 405 @ 472E, per Onu, JSC. Also held thus “Where there are 2 provisions, one special and the other general, covering the same subject matter, a case falling within the words of the special provision must be governed thereby and not by the terms of the general provision”: SCHROEDER vs. MAJOR & CO. (1989) 1 NSCC 399 @ 406 per Agbaje & Wali, JJSC.

Also, it is my understanding and submission that it is not the intendment or the spirit of the Constitution that the provisions of any statute such as the SCPA would render its provisions nugatory and unrealistic. The Supreme Court of Nigeria has held in A.C.B. V Losada (Nig.) Ltd. (1995) 7 NWLR (pt.405) 26 thus: ‘It has never been the case in our laws that the provisions of any ordinary statute would render nugatory the relevant provisions of the constitution. Therefore, if any law of the State including a subsidiary legislation… is inconsistent with the provision of the constitution, the provision of the constitution prevails and that State law is to the extent of inconsistency void’. It was also held in Achu v C.S.C. Cross Rivers State (2009) 3 NWLR (pt. 1129) 475, where the court held thus: ‘The provisions of an ordinary statute would not render nugatory the relevant provisions of the constitution’.

It is my considered view that a situation where an Applicant whose right or rights conferred on him under the Chapter IV of the Constitution and who has utilized the rights of seeking redress as conferred on him by the Constitution which provides thus ‘Any person who alleges that any of the provisions of this Chapter has been, is being or likely to be contravened in any State in relation to him, may apply to a High Court in that State for redress’, and complying with the FREPR, and having secured compensation in his favour but despite that, will be required and or mandated to seek consent of his opponent or the AGF or the AGS (where applicable) on the ground of the provisions of section 84 of the SCPR and other Rules subsidiary thereto, is in a way allowing the provisions of a statute to override the provisions of the Constitution and rendering the provisions of the Constitution (which confers the right of redress and compensation on the Applicant) nugatory and compromising the entitlement of the Applicant to enjoy the judgment sum is a great injustice! The Supreme Court of Nigeria has held on interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution, while laying down the guidelines for a court of law to follow when it held in Registered Trustees, A.O.N. V N.A.M.A. (2014) 8 NWLR (pt. 1408)1 SC. (pg. 61-62, H-B) thus ‘In the interpretation of any provisions of the Constitution, not only the letters, but also the spirit behind the provision must be taken into consideration’. Noteworthy also is the decision of the Court of Appeal of Nigeria in the case of Okungbowa v Gov. Edo State (2015)10 NWLR (pt. 1467) 257 C.A. (page 298, paragraphs B-C) which prohibits compromising the fundamental rights provisions under the Constitution thus ‘In the interpretation of any provisions of the Constitution, not only the letters but also the spirit behind the Constitution must be taken into consideration. In the determination of a person’s rights provisions and obligations, fundamental human rights provisions under the Constitution cannot be compromised’. (Underlining is mine for emphasis).

Furthermore, and like I have stated in the above paragraphs, in my course of seeking a way out of all these restrictions in enforcing the judgment sum by an Applicant, who is left with no opportunity of enjoying the fruits of his judgment by the requirement of seeking the consent of the AGF or the AGS, I considered the provisions of the Section 46(3) of the Constitution which confers powers on the CJN to make Rules and Procedures in relation to the provisions of the Chapter IV of the Constitution, which provides thus ‘(3) The Chief Justice of Nigeria may make rules with respect to the practice and procedure of a High Court for the purposes of this section.’. In my humble submission, the CJN having by this section of the Constitution, made the FREPR, the CJN also has the incidental powers to make Rules and Procedures (to give effect to same) for the enforcement of the judgment of the High Court which have been decided pursuant to the Chapter IV of the Constitution, other international statutes on human rights and the FREPR. I further humbly submit that in considering whether the CJN has the incidental powers to make the Fundamental Rights Judgment (Enforcement) Rules and departing from the provisions of the SCPA and its subsidiary(ies) for the enforcement of judgment in fundamental rights litigation, I place reliance on the provisions of section 318(4) of the Constitution which adopts the provisions of the Interpretation Act. The said section 318(4) of the Constitution provides thus (4) The Interpretation Act shall apply for the purposes of interpreting the provisions of this Constitution.’ Also, the Interpretation Act provides in section 10 for statutory powers and duties while section 12 provides on Construction of statutory powers and duties thus ‘10.  (1)   Where an enactment confers a power or imposes a duty, the power may be exercised and the duty shall be performed from time to time as occasion requires. (2)    An enactment which confers power to do any act shall be construed as also conferring all such other powers as are reasonably necessary to enable that act to be done or are incidental to the doing of it.’ And by Section 12 of the Interpretation Act, ‘12. (1) Where an Act confers a power to make a subsidiary instrument, proclamation or notification, the power shall include- (a) power to make different provision for different circumstances; (b) power, exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like consent and conditions (if any), to vary and revoke the instrument, proclamation or notification; (c) in the case of a subsidiary instrument, power to prescribe punishments for contravention of provisions of the instrument, not exceeding as respects a particular contravention- (i) in the case of rules of court imprisonment for a term of three months or a fine of fifty naira or both, (ii) in any other case, imprisonment for a term of six months or a fine of one hundred naira or both. (2) A contravention of a provision of a subsidiary instrument may be prosecuted in a summary manner.’. Also, by section 19 of the Interpretation Act, additional provision on interpretation of a subsidiary instrument is provided for thus ‘19. (1) An expression used in a subsidiary instrument has the same meaning as in the Act conferring power to make the instrument. (2) In a subsidiary instrument, the expression ‘the Act’ instruments means the Act conferring power to make the instrument.’

Furthermore, it is my humble submission that the Constitution is the enabling law pursuant to which the FREPR was made by the Honourable, the then CJN, as a subsidiary law. Therefore, I humbly submit that the FREPR only derives its source of powers from the Constitution. And the CJN too only derives his powers to make the FREPR from the Constitution just as the National Assembly derives its powers to make the SCPA. I rely on the case of:  Abia State University, Uturu v Anyaibe (supra).

Also noteworthy is the law that the SCPA is within the legislative competence of the National Assembly as an Act, pursuant to Section 4 of the Constitution and item 57 of the Part I of the 2nd Schedule to the Constitution, which provides thus 4.—(1) The legislative powers of the Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be vested in a National Assembly for the Federation which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.(2) The National Assembly shall have power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Federation or any part thereof with respect to any matter included in the Exclusive Legislative List set out in Part I of the Second Schedule to this Constitution.’. and by Part I of the Second Schedule to the Constitution, item 57 provides thus ‘Service and execution in a State of the civil and criminal processes, judgments, decrees, orders and other decisions of any court of law outside Nigeria or any court of law in Nigeria other than a court of law established by the House of Assembly of that State.’.

From the above arguments and submissions, what I am submitting is that the CJN has the Constitutional powers to make Rules and Procedures on the Service and execution in a State or High Court of the fundamental rights processes, judgments, decrees, orders and other decisions of any court of law outside Nigeria or any court of law in Nigeria so far it pertains to the fundamental rights enforcement suits. Section 46(2) of the Constitution has also conferred on the High Courts, such powers of making orders, judgment, etc., as follows: ‘(2) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, a High Court shall have original jurisdiction to hear and determine any application made to it in pursuance of the provisions of this section and may make such orders, issue such writs and give such directions as it may consider appropriate for the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement within that State of any right to which the person who makes the application may be entitled under this Chapter.’

Now the common approach to interpretation of the Constitution or Statute is to adopt the literal rule of interpretation by giving the words in the Constitution or the Statute their ordinary or grammatical meaning in order to bring out the intention of the legislature. It is also trite law that in the quest to interpret or construe the provisions of a statute or the Constitution, the Court or Tribunal must construe or interpret the statute or the Constitution in order to bring out plainly the real intention of the lawmaker or the framers of the Constitution and thus enhance its purpose. The Court or Tribunal has a bounden duty to consider as a whole the entire provisions of the law or the Constitution involved. The statute or the Constitution in question must not be construed in a manner that will do violence to the provisions being interpreted and must not be interpreted to defeat the ultimate design or purpose of the Constitution or statute that calls for interpretation. See: 1. HON. JAMES ABIODUN FALEKE V. INEC & ORS. (2016) 18 NWLR (PART 1543) 61 AT 117 F–H per KEKERE-EKUN, JSC, who said: “The settled canons of construction of constitutional provision are, inter alia, that the instrument must be considered as a whole, that the language is to be given a reasonable construction and absurd consequences are to be avoided. See: A-G, Bendel State v. A-G, Federation (1981) 10 SC 132–134, (1982) 3 NCLR 1; Ishola v. Ajiboye (1994) 6 NWLR (Pt.352) 506. It is equally well settled that where words used in the Constitution or in a Statute are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their natural and ordinary meaning, unless to do so would lead to absurdity or inconsistency with the rest of the statute. See: *Ojokolobo v. Alamu (1987) 3 NWLR Pt.61) 377 @ 402, F-H; Adisa v Oyinwola & Ors. (2000) 6 SC (Pt. II) 47, (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt. 674) 116; Saraki v. FRN (2016) LPELR–40013 SC, (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1500) 531.” 2. OCHOLI ONOJO JAMES, SAN V. INEC & ORS. (2015) 12 NWLR (PART 1474) 538 AT 588 D–G also per KEKERE-EKUN, JSC, who had this to say– “In interpreting the provisions of the Constitution and indeed any statute, one of the important considerations is the intention of the lawmaker. In addition to giving the words used, their natural and ordinary meaning (unless such construction would lead to absurdity), it is also settled that it is not the duty of the Court to construe any of the provisions of the Constitution in such a way as to defeat the obvious ends it was designed to serve where another construction equally in accord and consistent with the words and sense of such provisions will serve to enforce and protect such ends. See: Mohammed v. Olawunmi (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt. 133) 458; Rabiu v. The State (1981) 2 NCI-R 293; Adetayo v. Ademola (2010) 15 *NWLR (supra) @ 190 191 G–A, 205 D–F.”. 3.  CHIEF (MRS.) O. V. EHUWA V. ONDO STATE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION & ORS. (2006) 18 NWLR (PART 1012) 544 at 588: “It is settled law that the Court should, when interpreting the provisions of the Constitution, bear in mind that the function of the Constitution is to establish a framework and principles of Government, broad and in general terms, intended to apply to the varying conditions which the development of a plural and dynamic society must involve. Therefore, more technical rules of interpretation are to some extent inadmissible in a way as to defeat the principles of Government enshrined in the Constitution. Therefore, where the question is whether the Constitution has used an expression in the wider or in the narrower sense, the Court should, whenever possible, and in response to the demands of justice, lean to the broader interpretation, unless there is something in the text or in the rest of the Constitution to indicate that the narrow interpretation will best carry out the object and purpose of the Constitution. See: Rabiu v. Kano State (1981) 2 NCLR 293, (1980) 8/11 SC 130; Aqua Ltd. v. Ondo State Sport Council (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt.91) 622; Tukur v. Government of Gongola State (No.2) (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 517; A-G, Abia State v. A-G, Federation (2002) 6 NWLR (Pt. 763) 264. The proper approach to the interpretation of clear words of a statute is to follow them in their simple, grammatical and ordinary meaning rather than look further because that is what prima facie gives them their most reliable meaning. This is generally also true of construction of constitutional provisions if they are clear and unambiguous even when it is necessary to give them a liberal broad interpretation – see: Fawehinmi v. IG of Police & Ors. 7 NWLR (Pt. 767) 606 at 678.”. It must also be noted that a person who alleges that an Act of the National Assembly or a legislature is invalid or made outside the legislative powers conferred on it by the Constitution has the onus to prove the assertion. See: CHIEF EMMANUEL OLATUNDE LAKANMI V. PETER ADEBAYO ADENE & ORS. (2003) LPELR- 1750 (SC) 1 at per KALGO, JSC, who said: “That the Court then came to the conclusion that the appellant as plaintiff had the onus of adducing evidence to prove the invalidity or illegality of the relevant Decrees or Edicts or the order of forfeiture which divested him of his right to the property concerned before it was sold to the respondent. I agree entirely with the Court of Appeal that in the particular circumstances of this case the onus of proof lay squarely on the appellant. It did not shift and the appellant, as plaintiff, has the duty to prove that the laws or notice which took away his property from him were ineffective, null and void before he can succeed.”.  It was further held in this case (i.e. NIGERIA EMPLOYERS CONSULTATIVE ASSOCIATION & ANOR. vs. ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION & ORS (supra)) thus ‘One of the cardinal or ardent position of the law relating to interpretation of the statute is that a Court or Tribunal is not entitled to read into a law, things that are not contained in the statue or intended. A statute must be interpreted in a way that will not defeat the intention of the legislature. The words used in a statute must be given their natural and grammatical meaning. The provisions of a statute must be read communally giving important consideration to the intention of the law maker. See: 1. DR. O.A. Saraki v FRN (2016) 4 SCM 94 AT 132 G- H, Per Onnoghen, JSC now Ag. CJN.’ 2. Brittania- U Nigerian Ltd. V SPDC Ltd. & ORS (2016) 3 SCM 44 at 81 Per Ngwuta, JSC, who said ‘In construing the provisions reproduced above, there is no need to resort to external sources. The words used in them ought to be given their grammatical and ordinary meaning.’ Whatever method of interpretation is adopted, the paramount thing is that the intention of the law maker must not be circumvented or twisted’. (Per Peter Olabisi Ige, J.C.A.).

I therefore, hereby humbly urge My Lord, the Honourable, the CJN to utilize his powers pursuant to the section 46(3) of the Constitution and other enabling sections of the Constitution and the Interpretation Act, by making and or amending the provisions of the current FREPR or by passing a Practice Direction on Rules and Procedures on the Service and execution in a State or High Court of the fundamental rights processes, judgments, decrees, orders and other decisions of any court of law outside Nigeria or any court of law in Nigeria so far it pertains to the fundamental rights enforcement suits, which will depart from the provisions of the SCPA and its accompanying subsidiary especially the careless provisions of requirement for consent of the AGF or the AGS. I also call on the National Human Rights Commission, Nigerian Bar Association, human rights activists, non-governmental organizations protecting the human rights of Nigerian citizens to also use their influence in ensuring that My Lord, the Honourable, the CJN utilizes these his powers in the interest of justice and that of the public. It is specifically recommended that the Nigerian Bar Association should set up a Committee to immediately consider and make further recommendations for the implementation of this research work to My Lord, the Honourable, the CJN.

I therefore humbly recommend the following recommendations to My Lord, the Honourable, the Chief Judge of Nigeria who has been saddled with such powers in regard to fundamental rights pursuant to Section 46(3) of the Constitution, in promoting the fundamental rights of Nigerian citizens:

i. Immediately set up a committee to make a draft of the ‘Fundamental Rights’ Judgements (Enforcement) Rules’ being recommended by this paper;
ii. establishment of special panel courts in High Courts in Nigeria to hear fundamental rights enforcement cases;
iii. passing a Practice Direction on Rules and Procedures on the Service and execution in a State or High Court of the fundamental rights processes, judgments, decrees, orders and other decisions of any court of law outside Nigeria or any court of law in Nigeria so far it pertains to the fundamental rights enforcement suits, which will depart from the provisions of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act and its accompanying subsidiary legislations especially the careless (and militant) provisions of requirement for consent of the Attorney-General of the Federation or of the State before such moneys awarded to an Applicant under the Rules, can be garnished (even though Nigerian courts are recently departing from this issue of ‘no consent of the Attorney-General’ i.e. by making the ‘Fundamental Rights Judgments (Enforcement) Rules; this in my humble submission, is in line with the spirit behind the provision of section 46(3) of the Constitution which must be taken into consideration;
iv. there should be a quarterly monitoring of the implementation of the FREPR by the Chief Justice of Nigeria who has been constitutionally saddled with the protection of the FREPR, so as to affirm to the common man and everyone having roles to play in regard to fundamental rights enforcement (including Nigerian courts) that protection of fundamental rights is never negotiable!

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